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Abstract. Students spontaneously engage in epistemic cognition when reading conflicting scientific information. 
This study examines how this epistemic cognition is related to students’ actual beliefs. In addition, the interplay 
of students’ epistemic beliefs and prior attitudes when encountering conflicting and partly attitude-inconsistent 
information on a controversial socio-scientific is studied using think-aloud methods.  
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Introduction 
Students are often confronted with conflicting information on controversial socio-scientific topics 
when searching for information on the Internet. Such topics are characterised by the existence of 
competing theories and points of view for which there is no simple conclusion (Kobayashi, 2009).  
 
Epistemic Cognition in Action 
Epistemic cognition pertains to the processes involved in defining, acquiring, and using knowledge 
(Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Putra, 2008), and includes metacognitive thinking about the nature of 
knowledge and justification for knowing (Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010). Previous work has 
demonstrated that university students (Ferguson, Bråten, & Strømsø, 2012) as well upper level 
secondary school students (Mason, Ariasi, & Boldrin, 2011) spontaneously engage in epistemic 
cognition when reading multiple texts on controversial topics. That is, students verbalize epistemic 
reflections regarding the source of knowledge, justification of knowledge, simplicity and complexity 
of knowledge, and certainty and uncertainty of knowledge.  
 
Interplay of Epistemic Beliefs and Prior Attitudes 
In current models of epistemic cognition, the willingness to adjust beliefs is emphasized. Bendixen 
and Rule’s (2004) model, for instance, includes among other things mechanisms of change. This starts 
with epistemic doubt, i.e., questioning one’s beliefs, and requires epistemic volition, or the willingness 
to adapt these beliefs. Finally, resolution strategies are necessary to overcome doubt. 
Yet, learners’ prior attitudes may prevent learners from giving in to epistemic doubt or to undertake 
actions to change their beliefs. For instance, learners with strong prior attitudes may display a 
disconfirmation bias, i.e., a tendency to spend more time on and allocate more cognitive effort to 
information that is inconsistent with their attitudes and beliefs, while quickly and uncritically 
accepting information that supports these attitudes (Taber & Lodge, 2006). This could mean that 
students may be more inclined to see themselves as source of knowledge, but also that they are more 
critical of the status of attitude-inconsistent knowledge claims.  
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
As prior attitudes can thus strongly bias information processing, it is interesting to know how prior 
attitudes and epistemic cognition interact. The following research question were addressed: How do 
prior attitudes towards climate change influence students’ epistemic cognition when reading multiple 
texts containing conflicting information? In this study, participants were classified as holding either 
predominantly multiplist or evaluativist epistemic beliefs. At the multiplist level, people become 
aware of the uncertain and subjective nature of knowledge and knowing. However, this awareness 
overrules any objective standards for the evaluation of information. As a consequence, all opinions are 
deemed equally valuable and right. At the evaluativist level, uncertainty is acknowledged, but without 
ignoring the importance of evaluation of knowledge claims. That is, two positions can both be right, 
but one can be better supported by evidence, making it more valuable (Kuhn, 1999). 
It should be expected that students holding evaluativist epistemic beliefs would act according to 
these beliefs and come to the conclusion that their prior attitudes may not be right. However, if prior 
attitudes prevail, students should – irrespective of their epistemic beliefs –attach greater value to the 
information that is consistent with these attitudes than to information that is in line with scientific 
evidence and, as a consequence, more reliable. Students with evaluativist beliefs should act according 
to their epistemic beliefs, as could be evidenced by more epistemic reflections regarding justification 
of knowledge claims by authority, regarding the justification of knowledge claims by multiple sources, 
(Ferguson et al., 2012). Multiplists, on the other hand, are expected to verbalize more epistemic 




Participants were 25 11th grade students from a Dutch secondary school for pre-university education.  
 
Measures 
Prior attitudes on climate change were measured with a 12-item questionnaire (α= .84) developed for 
this study. Epistemic beliefs were measured using a modified version of a questionnaire previously 
validated among 11th grade students, which distinguishes between multiplism and evaluativism (Van 
Strien, Bijker, Brand-Gruwel, & Boshuizen, 2012; α = .64 for both scales). Utterances in think-aloud 
protocols were coded based on Ferguson et al. (2012), who distinguished between utterances reflecting 
certaintly/simplicity of knowledge, justification by authority, personal justification, or justification by 
means of multiple sources. 
 
Materials 
Participants read 16 texts on the evidence for man-made global warming. Half of the texts describes 
the insights from climate science as agreed on by the vast majority of climate scientists, whereas the 
other half challenges these views and contains information from less reliable sources. 
Procedure 
In a first session, 98 students from 11th grade filled in the prior attitudes measure and the epistemic 
beliefs questionnaire. Based on the outcomes, 25 students (12 boys; 13 girls) were selected to 
participate in a follow-up study. Participants were divided into one of two conditions depending on 
their prior attitudes. One condition consisted of students with sceptic attitudes toward climate change. 
The second condition consisted of students with neutral prior attitudes. In each group, participants had 
divergent scores on evaluativism and multiplism. During the individual session participants read a 
number of pre-selected texts on climate change while thinking aloud, and are asked to answer a short 
essay question. Participants were given 30 minutes to complete the task.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses using the coarse-grained coding scheme showed no significant differences in the 
relative number of utterances regarding certainty/simplicity of knowledge (t(23) = 0.26, p = .799), 
justification by authority (t(23) = 0.18, p = .857), personal justification (t(23) = -0.02, p = .981), nor 
justification by means of multiple sources (t(23) = -0.51, p = .612) between sceptics and students 
holding neutral attitudes. In general, students produced only a small proportion of utterances regarding 
justification of knowledge by authority (M = 0.072, SD = 0.060), but a relatively large proportion of 
utterances regarding personal justification (M = 0.45, SD = 0.12), with most participants paying only 
little attention to source information. These preliminary results might imply that students have 
difficulties with objectively and adequately evaluating information regardless of their prior attitudes. 
More fine-grained analyses are planned to gain a more detailed view of students’ responses to 
conflicting, partly attitude-inconsistent information as a function of their prior attitudes and epistemic 
beliefs. For instance, case studies of eight students with either pronounced evaluativist or multiplist 
beliefs suggest that among sceptics, those holding multiplist beliefs may be less inclined to justify 
knowledge claims using multiple sources than those holding evaluativist beliefs. 
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